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INCONSISTENCIES IN PUBLIC UTILITY
DEPRECIATIO~

Robert D. Haun*
OLUMES have been written1 on the subject of public utility
depreciation.2 Involving, as it does, principles of accounting, economics, engineering and law, the subject is highly controversial. Certainly it is an important factor in public utility regulation. Annual
depreciation, 3 which may be included in expenses to be covered by

V

* B.A., State College of Washington; M.A., University of Chicago; J.D., Michigan; C.P.A., Kentucky; Professor of Accounting, University of Kentucky College of
Commerce.-Ed.
The most recent addition to the field is MASON, PRINCIPLES OF PuBLIC UTILITY
DEPRECIATION (1937) (American Accounting Association).
2 Depreciation is defined in Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 292 U. S.
151 at 167, 54 S. Ct. 658 (1933), as follows: "Broadly speaking, depreciation is the
loss, not restored by current maintenance, which is due to all the factors causing ultimate
retirement of the property. These factors embrace wear and tear, decay, inadequacy, and
obsolescence."
Other definitions of depreciation are: (I) "Briefly, depreciation consists of the
consumption of property in service." W1scoNSIN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPRECIATION 4 ( I 93 3). ( 2) " ••• depreciation is the loss in service value not restored
by current maintenance and incurred in connection with the consumption or prospective retirement of property in the course of service from causes against which the
carrier is not protected by insurance, which are known to be in current operation, and
whose effect can be forecast with a reasonable approach to accuracy." Telephone and
Railroad Depreciation Charges, 177 I. C. C. 351 at 422 (1931). (3) "Depreciation,
as applied to depreciable utility plant, means the loss in service value not restored by
current maintenance, incurred in connection with the consumption or prospective
retirement of utility plant in the course of service from causes which are known to be
in current operation and against which the utility is not protected by insurance. Among
the causes to be considered are wear and tear, decay, action of the elements, inadequacy,
obsolescence, changes in the art, changes in demand and requirements of public authorities, and, in some cases, the exhaustion of natural resources." Report of the Special Committee on Depreciation, 1938 PRoc. NAT. AssN. R.R. & UT1L. CoMMRS. 441.
More concise definitions frequently used for depreciation are: "expired capital
outlay," "an allocation of the entire cost of depreciable assets to the operating expenses
of a series of fiscal pc;riods," "the loss in total intrinsic value of a unit or item of structural property in its existing position and relationship as part of a utility plant," and
"decline in value in use of fixed tangible assets, particularly buildings and equipment."
3
Annual depreciation is the allowance charged by a utility against its operating
expenses in order to retain, out of its profits, assets to provide for future retirement
of property consumed in the public service. In Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co.,
292 U.S. 151 at 167, 54 S. Ct. 658 (1933), Chief Justice Hughes said: "Annual
depreciation is the loss which takes place in a year. In determining reasonable rates for
supplying public service, it is proper to include in the operating expenses, th:it is, in
the cost of producing the service, an allowance for consumption of capital in order to
maintain the integrity of the investment in the service rendered."
1
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rates charged/ amounts to from twenty to twenty-five per cent of
total operating expenses, exclusive of taxes, in the case of electric and
telephone utilities.5 Accrued depreciation,6 which must be deducted for
rate base purposes,7 would amount to only slightly less than fifty per
cent of the total depreciable value of the depreciating properties of a
mature utility company if calculated by the straight-line method.
The interest of public utility operators in securing a large return
for their investors leads them to seek the greatest possible annual
allowance for depreciation and the smallest deduction for accrued
depreciation which is permissible. In their efforts to increase .the one
and to minimize the other, they insist that the accrued depreciation in
the utility's properties at any given date is determined by the per cent
efficiency thereof, though this may be only a small fraction of the sum
of past annual depreciation provisions on that property as shown by the
depreciation reserve 8 on the books. Some courts have accepted this
inconsistent view without any apparent reservation. 9 In other cases the
inconsistency between past annual depreciation and present accrued
depreciation is approved, but adjustment in future annual depreciation
~ Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U. S. 1, 29 S. Ct. 148 (1909); Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 292 U.S. 151, 54 S. Ct. 658 (1933).
G 1938 PRoc. NAT. AssN. R.R. & UT1L. CoMMRS. 425.
6
Accrued depreciation is the total amount of depreciation existing in a unit of
property at a given time as a result of the accumulation of depreciation from the date
of acquisition of the property. It has been defined as follows: "the amount of value
which the property has lost in the past-or the difference between its 'brand new' and
'present fair' value." WELCH, CASES ON PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 493 (1932)
[2d ed., 544 (1936) ].
7
Railroad Commission of Louisiana v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 212 U. S.
414, 29 S. Ct. 357 (1909); McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400, 47
S. Ct. 144 (1926); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Comm.,
187 La. 137, 174 So. 180 (1937).
8 In accounting for depreciation at the close of each fiscal period, the accountant
makes an entry charging depreciation expense and crediting an account called reserve
for depreciation. This depreciation expense account is then used in determining the net
income and, to the extent that income is thus reduced, the amount which might otherwise have been paid in dividends is decreased. It is only in this way that the accounting
for depreciation has any effect upon assets available to care for replacements. The
reserve for depreciation account accumulates over the life of the depreciating asset as a
result of these periodic entries for depreciation. On any given date the reserve for
depreciation account will show the amount which it is estimated the depreciating
property has declined in value and the amount of assets withheld from availability for
dividends because of the depreciation accounting. For a more complete consideration
of this matter, see MASON, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC-UTILITY DEPRECIATION 27-46
(1937).
9
State ex rel. Laclede Gas & Light Co. v. Public Service Comm., 341 Mo. 920,
IIO S. W. (2d) 749 at 773 (1937).
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is required in order to prevent excessive increases of the depreciation
reserve in the future. 10 A few cases even go so far as to permit future
annual depreciation only in such amounts as will provide a reserve at
the time of retirement equal to the loss sustained at that time. 11
Misled by their own loose use, in the field of rate regulation, of
the term "value," 12 which in the economic sense derived its meaning
from unregulated transactions involving the sale and use of property,
the courts have proceeded to draw a specious analogy between eminent
domain and rate regulation in attempting to apply the unreal doctrine
of "fair value" enunciated in Smyth v. Ames.18 One result is that
courts largely disregard past annual depreciation in determining accrued
depreciation because such past allowances are conceived to have no
effect on "present fair value." Such a view fails entirely to recognize
the regulated nature of utility operations and leads to depreciation
practices and policies inherent with injustice to the public where intentional or honest errors result in excessive annual depreciation
allowances, or with injustice to the utility where too meager annual
depreciation has been taken.14 It would seem that some consistent principles of annual and accrued depreciation should be adopted to the end
that these injustices may be eliminated.
Depreciation is a matter of valuation and of the determination of
the cost of rendering public service.15 It is only incidentally related to
replacements,16 and accounting for depreciation will not necessarily
provide for replacements.17 Since depreciation does have to do primarily with valuation and determination of the cost of rendering
10

Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm., (Wis. 1939) 287 N. W. 167.
Re New York Tel. Co., (N. Y. Pub. Serv. Comm., State Div. 1936) 14 P. U. R.
(N. S.) 443.
12
Kauper, "Wanted a New Definition of the Rate Base," 37 M1cH. L. REv.
1209 at 1215 (1939), points out the failure of the United States Supreme Court to
give a satisfactory explanation of the meaning of fair value." See also NEW YoRK CoMMISSION ON REVISION OF PuBLIC SERVICE CoMMiss10Ns LAw, MINORITY REPORT 250
(1930) (N. Y. Leg. Doc. 75).
13
169 U.S. 466, 18 S. Ct. 418 (1898).
14
In the first case the public will have contributed to the capital of the utility,
but will have no claim therein. Board of Public Utility Commrs. v. New York Tel.
Co., 271 U. S. 23, 46 S. Ct. 363 (1926). In the latter situation the utility must
nevertheless deduct accrued depreciation as "found" at the date of the valuation though
it far exceeds the balance of the reserve for depreciation account.
lG CoLE, THE FUNDAMENTALS oF AccoUNTING 107-108 (1921). See also the
dissent of Justice Brandeis in United Railways & Electric Co. of Baltimore v. West,
280 U. S. 234 at 255, 50 S. Ct. 123 (1930).
16
MASON, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC-UTILITY DEPRECIATION 27-40 (1937).
17
Ibid., 44-46.
11
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service, and since capital devoted to public utility use is subject to
regulation, it would seem that consistency in principles is not only
desirable but attainable. It is the purpose of this article to examine
the cases decided by the courts and by the regulatory commissions of
the various jurisdictions to determine the manner in which this consistency may be achieved.
DEPRECIATION AccouNTING PRIMARILY A CoMMISSION PROBLEM

There is evidence in the early cases of a complete lack of understanding of depreciation and an unwillingness to consider it as an element of operating expense except as renewals might be charged thereto. 18
Even so late as 1903 we find the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Holmes, saying:
''We will say a word about the opposite contention of the
appellant, that there should have been allowance for depreciation
over and above the allowance for repairs. From a constitutional
point of view we see no sufficient evidence that the allowance for
six per cent on the value set by the supervisors, in addition to
what was allowed for repairs, is confiscatory." 19
The six per cent allowance was for return on capital and therefore no
depreciation was allowed. Such a view could only be maintained on a
theory that the property, so long as it remains in service, is worth as
·much as when new. Proponents of this theory are cited by Bonbright
and the fallacies of their arguments exposed. 20
With the development of the commission system of regulation, the
necessity for consideration of depreciation has gradually attained full
recognition. A:ffecting, as it does, both the operating expenses and the
rate base, it cannot be disregarded. It was therefore inevitable that the
regulatory commissions should assume or be given control over the depreciation practices and policies of public utilities. 21 In the exercise of
this control two legal issues arise. First, has the commission authority
to prescribe methods of depreciation accounting? This may depend
upon the statute under which such action is attempted and upon judicial
decisions concerning the exercise of such authority under the due process
clause. Federal statutes quite generally authorize the federal com18 WiscoNSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CoMMISSioN, DEPRECIATION
19

San Diego Land

(1903).
20
2
21

&

Town Co. v. Jasper,

189 U.

BoNBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY

S.

439

69 (1933).
446, 23 S.

at

II28 (1937).
41 (1937).

MASON, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC-UTILITY DEPRECIATION

Ct.
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m1ss1ons to prescribe accounting methods.22 State statutes have also
authorized their commissions in similar respects. 23 Justice Brandeis,
in his dissenting opinion in the United Railways case24 cites numerous
state commissions which have prescribed rules of depreciation accounting procedure requiring the maintenance of book records of cost of
property and the calculation of depreciation on the basis of such book
cost. Commissions long ago discovered that effectJ.ve regulation of rates
requires supervision over accounting methods, and depreciation accounting particularly requires this. As appears elsewhere in this article,2 c
depreciation and maintenance are closely related, and duplication of
charges in the accounts for these may easily occur in the absence of
clear-cut rules as to what items must be charged to repairs and what
treated as replacements. The latter involve an adjustment of the
reserve for depreciation account after removal of the original asset
from the property account with an addition thereto of the new item.
Likewise the requirement that annual depreciation be calculated on
original cost of the property has seemed essential in view of the impossibility of an adequate annual revaluation of the utility property. 26
The courts have seen no cause to deny jurisdiction to the commissions to prescribe reasonable accounting regulations. 21 It is true that
22
Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. (1935), § 20 (5); Federal Communications Act, 48 Stat. L. 1064 (1934), 47 U.S. C. (1935), § 220.
23
See the brief of the United States, Amicus Curia, in Driscoll v. Edison Electric
Co., 307 U.S. 104, 59 S. Ct. 715 (1939), for citation of state statutes, Appendix D.,
P· 139.
24
United Railways & Electric Co. of Baltimore v. West, 280 U. S. 234, 50
S. Ct. 123 (1930).
25
Infra, page I 70.
26
See NEw YoRK CoMMISSION ON REVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICE CoMMISSIONS
kw MrnoruTY REPORT 353-355 (1930) (N. Y. Leg. Doc. 75).
27
In New York Edison Co. v. Maltbie, 271 N. Y. 103, 2 N. E. (2d) 277
(1936), the New York Court of Appeals seems to throw doubt on this issue by upholding a lower court order to the New York commission to change certain rules,
including that for straight-line depreciation, prescribed in its "Uniform System of
Accounts for Gas, Electric, Steam, Water and Bus Companies." The court held that
under the statute providing that the Public Service Commission should "have power,
in its discretion, to prescribe uniform methods of keeping-accounts, records, and books"
to be observed by public utility corporations, the commission could not prescribe that
straight-line depreciation methods be followed, and that accounts be rewritten on the
basis of original cost and excess of book cost over original cost be transferred to a
suspense account and written off against income or surplus. This, it is said, would be
prescribing uniform methods of management rather than uniformity as to book entries
in respect to what the company may do. This applies to the writing off of the suspense
account. As to the requirement of straight-line depreciation, the argument was that the
regulation was ultra vires. Following this case, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, Third Department, held in two cases, Long Island Lighting Co. v. Maltbie,
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the Supreme Court in Board of Public Utility Commissioners v. New
York Telephone Co. 28 sustained an injunction against rates prescribed
by the New Jersey commission in a case where the commission had
found an excessive depreciation reserve and had attempted to remedy
the situation by limiting depreciation charges to an amount less than
accruing depreciation so as to cause a gradual disappearance of the
excess in the reserve. Likewise it is true that in the United Railways
case the United States Supreme Court seemed, temporarily at least, to
establish the rule that annual depreciation must be calculated on present
fair value and not upon cost. However, these were confiscation cases
and the question of a commission's jurisdiction to prescribe accounting
regulations was not a basic issue. In I 9 I 3 the Supreme Court upheld
the power of commissions to require amortization of losses from
abandonment of property as an accounting regulation. 29 Mr. John E.
Benton, General Solicitor for the National Association of Railroad and
Utility Commissioners, at the 1938 convention of that association
quoted from three United States Supreme Court cases so to indicate
support for the view that the courts will not attempt to compel st~te
commissions to fit their depreciation accounting regulations to the particular rule respecting depreciation which the Court follows in determining whether rates are confiscatory. 81 These cases, and the comment
249 App. Div. 918, 292 N. Y. S. 807 (1937), and Yonkers Ry. v. Maltbie, 251
App. Div. 204, 296 N. Y. S. 4II (1937), that the straight-line method was not
erroneous where there is factual foundation for its adoption in a rate case. The earlier
case seems to go strictly on statutory grounds.
28
271 U. S. 23, 46 S. Ct. 363 (1937).
29
Kansas City Southern Ry. v. United States, 231 U. S. 423, 34 S. Ct. 125
(1913).
80
Norfolk & Western Ry. v. United States, 287 U.S. 134, 53 S. Ct. 52 (1932);
State Corporations Comm. v. Wichita Gas Co., 290 U.S. 561, 54 S. Ct. 321 (1933);
Los Angeles Gas & Electric Co. v. Railroad ColllDlission of California, 289 U. S.
287, 53 S. Ct. 637 (1933).
81
The latest word of the Supreme Court on the judicial function in cases of this
sort is as follows: "When the rate-making agency of the State gives a fair hearing,
receives and considers the competent evidence that is offered, affords opportunity
through evidence and argument to challenge the result, and makes its determination
upon evidence and not arbitrarily, the requirements of procedural due process are met,
and the question that remains for this Court, or a lower federal court, is not as to the
mere correctness of the method and reasoning adopted by the regulating agency, but
whether the rates it fixes will result in confiscation." Railroad Commission of California
v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302 U.S. 388 at 393-394, 58 S. Ct. 334 (1938). In
inte~reting this as respects depreciation, the three-judge statutory court to which this
case was returned for findings said: "Notwithstanding the decision of the Supreme
Court in that case [Board of Public Utility Commrs. v. New York Tel. Co., 271 U. S.
23, 46 S. Ct. 363 (1937)] that an excessive depreciation reserve belonged to the
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of the Court in American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. United
States 32 appear adequately to warrant the statement of Mr. Benton
that a commission, in order to insure against its rate order being set
aside by the Court as the result of its action in prescribing depreciation
accounting rules, must
"fix rates upon a level which will yield a total revenue large
enough to cover operating expenses, as the court may compute
them, including depreciation, as the court may compute depreciation, plus a return at_ such rate as the court may consider fair, upon
a value which the court may fix as the reasonable minimum upon
which a return should be permitted." 33
It is this fixing of rates at an adequately high level which raises the
second legal issue of commission control over depreciation policies and
practices. While it may be true, as has just been pointed out, that due
process is not violated by reasonable regulatory measures respecting
depreciation, the commissions must not lose sight of the fact that the
courts have the final word as to what may properly be included as
operating expense and what is to be considered the rate base in cases
involving the constitutional issue of confiscation through inadequate
rates. It is therefore requisite that, in fixing rates in reliance on such
Company and could not be utilized by the Board of Public Utilities to eke out its
estimate of income in later years, the Supreme Court has recently in a number of
cases recognized the use of a sinking fund to take care of the annual and accrued
depreciation. Clark's Ferry Bridge Co. v. Public Service Commission, 291 U. S. 227,
54 S. Ct. 427 [(1934)]; see also Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 292 U.S. 290, 54 S. Ct. 647 [(1934) ] .•.• The court held that there was
no confiscation of property inherent in such a plan and that the question of whether
or not the allowance of depreciation thus made was reasonable was one of fact to be
determined, in the first instance, by the rate making body. • •• This method, it will
be observed, takes no account of the fluctuating value or cost of the various elements
entering into the property but assigns to each a value (its cost when acquired by the
Utility Company, if prudently acquired) which remains constant during its entire life.
There is no place in such a rate making plan for use of the present value of the property, or average value, as determined from cost of reproduction new or otherwise. It
follows that, as the costs decrease, thus decreasing the present value of the property, the
depreciation allowance fixed by the Commission would be too high, and as the reproduction costs increase the allowance will be too low. But the task of the court to
determine whether or not a rate is confiscatory relates to the value of the property at
the particular time when the rates under attack are to be effective. The question of
confiscation is determined for this period by the return on the present value, notwithstanding the fact that a different method may have been used by the rate making
body in arriving at its conclusion." Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Railroad Commission
of California, (D. C. Cal. 1938) 26 F. Supp. 507 at 522-523.
82
299 U. S. 232, 57 S. Ct. 170 (1936).
33
1938 PRoc. NAT. AssN. R.R. & Unt. CoMMRS. 266.
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accounting regulations as may be prescribed, the commissions give due
regard to judicial opinion as to the amounts to be allowed for annual
depreciation and to be deducted for accrued depreciation. In any case
they must of course afford an opportunity for full hearing with the
privilege of offering evidence and making argument if the issue of
inadequacy is raised. A sufficiently high rate may overcome an inadequate depreciation allowance in operating expenses or an excessive
deduction for accrued depreciation resulting from particular accounting procedures prescribed, but the rate will be sufficiently high only
when the commission recognizes the error in the procedure and takes
it into account when setting the rate. It is necessary, therefore, to consider what rules, if any, the courts apply in regard to depreciation.
One further point is to be noted concerning the character of public
utility depreciation as essentially a problem for the regulatory commissions. If a utility contends rates prescribed by a regulatory body in
its quasi-legislative capacity are unconstitutional, the courts place the
burden on the utility to show in what way the rate is unconstitutional. 34
The above factors, together with the fundamental fact that the
legislatures have quite generally given plenary authority to the commissions to regulate, give to the cases reported from the various regulatory commissions and which present the views of competent, fairminded officials based upon direct contact with the practical problems
involved in rate regulation, an importance for our purposes second only
to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court on the constitutional issues involved. They may even in some ways show the direction
in which future decisions of the Court may be expected to go.
THE ANNUAL DEPRECIATION ALLOWANCE

Justification of Inclusion in Operating Expenses
As has been said, the Knoxville case 85 established the right of the
utility to include depreciation in the determination of the total return
to be provided by consumers. Justice Moody, speaking for the Court
in that case, said:
·
"It [ the utility company] is entitled to see that from earnings the
value of the property invested is kept unimpaired, so that at the
end of any given term of years the original investment remains as
it was at the beginning. It is not only the right of the company to
make such a provision, but it is its duty to its bond and stock:34
88

Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 292 U.S. 151, 54 S. Ct. 658 (1933).
Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U. S. 1, 29 S. Ct. 148 (1909),
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holders, and, in the case of a public service corporation at least, its
plain duty to the public." 36
The Court here seems to rest this duty on the need to provide for
replacements, and says if the utility does not make this provision
and does not exact sufficient returns to cover it "whether this is the
result of unwarranted dividends upon overissues of securities or of
omission to exact proper prices for the output, the fault is its own."
Several issues raised by the above quotations remain unanswered
by the words of the Court. The Court does not make clear whether
the "original investment" to be kept unimpaired is the dollar investment or the real capital represented by the dollars originally invested
in particular property. In other words, it does not indicate what is to be
used as the basis for the annual depreciation allowance. Neither
does it appear clearly just what is meant by the "duty" of the utility
to provide for depreciation, nor what elements are to be included in
annual depreciation. The basis for annual depreciation and the "duty"
to provide for depreciation will be considered later. At present we are
concerned with what the courts say as to the nature of depreciation,
whatever the basis for its computation may be. Nothing in the Knoxville case indicates that anything more than lack of "newness" of the
properties was involved in the meaning there attached to the term.
Certainly the Court had in mind, however, more than deferred maintenance, since it speaks of provision for replacement. In the vast majority of cases in the courts, the issue of accrued depreciation receives
almost exclusive attention, and one must search for crumbs of wisdom
concerning the annual depreciation allowance. As a result of the prevailing inconsistencies, it is impossible t9 imply any applicable rule for
annual depreciation from what may be said concerning accrued depreciation.
The United States Supreme Court in the United Railways case did
consider specifically the matter of the annual allowance, though particularly from the point of view of the proper "basis" for the computation of the charge. It seems of little help, however, on the question of
just what elements are involved in the allowance. The court stated:
"One of the items of expense to be ascertained and deducted is the
amount necessary to restore property worn out or impaired, so as
continuously to maintain it as nearly as practicable at the same level
of efficiency for the public service. The amount set aside periodically for this purpose is the so-called depreciation allowance.
36

Ibid.,

212

U. S. at 13-14.
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The utility 'is entitled to see that from earnings the value of the
property invested is kept unimpaired, so that at the end of any
given term of years the original investment remains as it was at the
beginning.' ... This naturally calls for expenditures equal to the
cost of the worn out equipment at the time of replacement." 37
The Court thus reaffirms the Knoxville case decision and adds a
basis for the annual allowance. It is not difficult to construe this terminology as applying only to loss of physical efficiency, or at most to this
plus deferred maintenance. But utility attorneys concede no such limitation on annual depreciation allowances, and the commissions appear
always to have admitted depreciation in an amount larger than deferred maintenance.
An Oklahoma case gives a better statement of the purpose of the
annual depreciation allowance:
"As to the amount of expenditures made to take care of current
repair and maintenance, there is no controversy; but appellant contends that it should be permitted to earn annually, in addition
to the amount necessary to make current repairs, a sum sufficient
to make good the annual depreciation, and to replace the parts of
property when they become so deteriorated as to be no longer
usable. All the evidence is to the effect that there is at all times
going on in a plant of this character a depreciation that cannot be
overcome by repair. It is rare that any physical property impaired
by time and use can be so repaired as to be equivalent to the same
property new." 88
This comment clearly leaves room for the inclusion of all loss of
service life through use, whatever the cause. It emphasizes the fact
that while the plant as a composite of changing parts of varying ages
may continue in service, nevertheless its parts suffer from deterioration
and depreciation in the lessening of their service life, so that the plant
as a whole suffers depreciation.
In laying down the definition of depreciation in the Lindheimer
case 89 the United States Supreme Court was speaking particularly of
annual depreciation. This definition clearly embraces loss of service
value through operation of obsolescence factors. Where the effect of
87
United Railways & Electric Co. of Baltimore v. West, 280 U. S. 234 at 253254, 50 S. Ct. 123 (1930), quoting from Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212
U. S. l at 13-14, 29 S. Ct. 148 (1909).
88
Pioneer Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Westenhaver, 29 Okla. 429 at 451, II8 P. 354
(19n).
89
Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 292 U. S. 151 at 167, 54 S. Ct. 658
(1933).

170

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 38

such factors in terminating service life can be foreseen with reasonable
certainty, a utility need have no fear of exclusion of provision therefor
in the annual allowance.4 ° Clearly such allowance may be taken when
retirement has been made necessary by any of these factors.
What has been said here concerning depreciation and the foreseeability of retirement does not completely answer the questions as
to the nature of the annual depreciation charge and factors included
in its determination. Further light will be thrown upon this problem
when we consider the "duty" to provide for depreciation, and the
procedure permitted when unexpected retirements are necessitated for
one cause or another. Also, in discussing the methods of calculating
annual depreciation, further thought is given the matter of prediction
of retirements.
Depreciation and Maintenance Closely Related
There is a close relationship between repairs and depreciation. No
absolute line can be drawn between repairs, which in effect are simply
minor replacements, and the major replacements which occur only at
longer intervals and for which annual depreciation expense allowances
are made. It is certain, however, that the same theory as to the dividing
line must underlie both repair and depreciation treatment. Otherwise,
duplication of expense charges may occur and the depreciation reserve
may increase unduly because charges thereto for retirements will not
be as great as assumed at the outset when the predictions underlying
the annual depreciation provision were made. This principle is recognized by the United States Supreme Court 41 together with other
bodies.42 In addition, it is readily seen that the span of life which may
be expected of any depreciating property may be extended, within
limits, by a progressive policy in the handling of repairs and mainten-

'0 Simpson v. Shepard (Minnesota Rate Cases), 230 U. S. 352, 33 S. Ct. 729
(1913); Kansas City Southern Ry. v. United States, 231 U. S. 423, 34 S. Ct. 125
(1913); Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., 246 U. S. 178, 38 S. Ct. 278 (1918);
Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 292 U. S. 151, 54 S. Ct. 658 (1933); Public
Service Comm. v. United Railways & Electric Co. of Baltimore, 155 Md. 572, 142
A. 870 (1928), appeal dismissed United Railways & Electric Co. of Baltimore v.
West, 278 U.S. 567, 49 S. Ct. 79 (1930); Cheltenham & Abington Sewerage Co.
v. Public Service Comm., 122 Pa. Super. 252, 186 A. 149 (1936).
n Lincoln Gas & Electric Light Co. v. Lincoln, 223 U. S. 349, 32 S. Ct. 271
(1912); Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Utility Comm., 292 U. S. 290, 54
S. Ct. 647 (1934); Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 292 U. S. 151, 54 S. Ct.
658 (1933).
2
~ In re Rates of Queens Borough Gas & Electric Co., 2 N. Y. Pub. Serv. Comm.
Rep. 544 (1911); Printing Co. v. Madison Gas & Electric Co., 4 Wis. R.R. Comm.
Rep. ·501 (1910).
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ance. It was on the basis of this fact, and the company's claim that it
ha~ always kept its property in a high state of repair, that the Court
in the Lindheimer case was brought to deny the company's concurrent
claim that its annual depreciation charge, taken during the period of
controverted rates, should be allowed though it exceeded the amount
allowed by the Court in the prior appeal and had produced a reserve
greater than the observed depreciation as estimated by the company.
In view of the intimate relationship existing between depreciation
and maintenance, the suggestion has been made that consideration be
given to a joint provision for the two. 48 Under such a plan, repairs
would be charged to the depreciation and repairs reserve and no attempt
would be made to relieve the property account of the cost of any minor
replacements involved. Major replacements would continue to be
handled by adjusting the asset and reserve accounts. Cost of the new
item would be added to the asset account. Such treatment would not
only give full recognition to the relationship between depreciation and
maintenance. It would also lead to a fuller consideration of the propriety of what otherwise appears to be an excessive depreciation allowance in the early years of the life of a given property, while repair
costs are slight, as compared with the charge in later years when
repairs have become heavier. Perhaps some such plan is required to
avoid the dilemma of the utility in Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston," where the company was denied permission to charge off over a
future period deferred maintenance which had accumulated during
the war because of the government's request that materials and labor
be released for war purposes.
Further consideration of increasing repair costs as offsets to early
heavy charges for depreciation will appear under the discussion of
methods of calculating the annual depreciation allowance. While considerable merit may be found in a joint provision for depreciation and
maintenance, Mason himself points out that it is little used and only one
state commission has used it as a matter of general policy, though others
have prescribed it in isolated cases. 'G
So long as the provision for annual depreciation and that for repairs are kept separate, it is essential that the regulatory commission
prescribe clear-cut rules concerning treatment of replacements. Other48

MASON, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC-UTILITY DEPRECIATION 82 (1937).

"258 U. S. 388, 42 S. Ct. 351 (1922).
4
G MAsoN, PRINCIPLES OF PtraLic-UnLITY DEPRECIATION 82 (1937). A related
plan was allowed in Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Ohio Public Utility Comm., 292
U. S. 290, 54 S. Ct. 647 (1934), in which a reserve for maintenance and a special
maintenance fund was given approval.
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wise the opportunity mentioned above for duplication of charges exists.
Steps in this direction have been taken by the National Association of
Railroad and Utility Commissioners, the Federal Power Commission
and the Federal Communications Commission. 46 The Interstate Commerce Commission has long recognized this close relationship between
depreciation and maintenance and has applied rules governing the
handling of repairs and replacements. Of course the recommendations
of the National Association of Railroad and Utility Commissioners
amount to nothing more than recommendations to the various state
commissioners, but they are given considerable weight by the state
commissioners and they do indicate the trend of commission opinion.

The Basis for the Annual Depreciation Charge
The methods by which the annual depreciation charge is calculated
and the bases for computation of the charge have given rise to extended
discussion. So far as the Supreme Court of the United States is concerned, it seemed that the base to be used had finally been determined
in the United Railways case.47 It is difficult to see just what the Court
means by "expenditures equal to the cost of the worn out equipment
at the time of replacement," 48 since the replaced property is not being
acquired at the time the annual depreciation allowance is computed.
Moreover, the ultimate replacement may not in fact be identical or even
similar in nature to the old property. Of course, the determination of
the depreciation under such a rule involves all the difficulties that arise
in determining fair value for rate base purposes, except that these difficulties must now be dealt with each year by the commissions and the
utilities.
¼s 1938 PRoc. NAT. AssN. R. R. & UnL. CoMMRS. 447.
47
United Railways & Electric Co. of Baltimore v. West, 280 U. S. 234, 50 S.

Ct. 123 (1930).
48 Ibid., 280 U. S. at 253-254. The Court said, in answer to the Maryland
commission's contention for original cost which the lower court had denied: "One of
the items of expense to be ascertained and deducted is the amount necessary to restore
property worn out or impaired, so as continuously to maintain it as nearly as practicable at the same level of efficiency for public service. The amount set aside periodically
for this purpose is the so-called depreciation allowance. Manifestly this allowance cannot
be limited by the original cost, because, if values have advanced, the allowance is not
sufficient to maintain the level of efficiency. The utility is entitled to see that from
earnings the value of the property invested is kept unimpaired, so that at the end of any
given term of years the original investment remains as it was at the beginning. . • •
This naturally calls for expenditures equal to the cost of the worn out equipment at
the time of replacement; and this for all practical purposes means present value. It is
the settled rule of this Court that the rate base is present value, and it would be wholly
illogical to adopt a different rule for depreciation."
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In the United Railways case Justice Brandeis gave a vigorous dissenting opinion supporting original cost as the basis for the annual
depreciation allowance. Justice Holmes· joined in this dissent and Justice Stone 1\'rote a separate dissenting opinion agreeing with Justice
Brandeis on the method of ascertaining depreciation. Justice Brandeis
admittedly opposed the fair value rule for rate purposes.49 However,
he said that acceptance of that doctrine does not require that the repreciation charge be based on present value of plant:
"For, an annual depreciation charge is not a measure of the actual
consumption of plant during the year. No such measure has yet
been invented. There is no regularity in the development of depreciation. It does not proceed in accordance with any mathematical law. There is nothing in business experience, or in the training
of experts, which enables man to say to what extent service life
will be impaired by the operations of a single year, or of a series
of years less than the service life. . .. The depreciation charge is an
allowance made pursuant to a plan of distribution of the total net
expense of plant retirement." 50
The purposes of the annual depreciation allowance, he said, are three
in number: (I) to preserve the integrity of the investment, ( 2.) to
distribute equitably over service life the only expense of plant retirement which is capable of reasonable ascertainment-original cost less
salvage, and (3) to facilitate determination of financial results of the
period's operations.
It should be pointed out that Justice Brandeis' views as to annual
depreciation are hardly compatible with a complete acceptance of fair
value as a rate base. Presumably the same principles and theories apply
to the determination of depreciation for whatever purpose it is made,
and if depreciation based on present fair value cannot be reasonably
ascertained for annual depreciation purposes it cannot be for purposes
of deduction from fair value new for rate base purposes. Preservation
of the integrity of the investment, as has been seen,51 depends solely
upon what is meant by "investment," and ascertainment of financial
results of operation is no more important than determination of finan49
See the dissenting opinions by Brandeis in Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 262 U. S. 276 at 289, 43 S. Ct. 544 (1923);
and in St. Louis & O'Fallon R. R. v. United States, 279 U. S. 461 at 488, 49 S. Ct.
384 (1929).
50
United Railways & Electric Co. v. West, 280 U.S. 234 at 262, 264, 50 S. Ct.
123 (1930).
51
Supra, p. 168.
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cial condition. Thus, it appears how inconsistent it is to use fair value
for rate base purposes and accrued depreciation, while cost is used in
calculating annual depreciation. Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion is,
therefore, as much a criticism of the fair value rule for rate base and
accrued depreciation purposes as it is of the use of fair value in determining annual depreciation. There would appear to be no sound reason
for saying that a return is to be allowed on one investment and at the
same time provide for a return of another investment to the utility
investors. This is giving two different meanings to what is obviously the
same factor in two phases of rate determination.
The Virginia Supreme Court took the view 52 that the Supreme
Court of the United States in the Lindheimer case impliedly overruled
the United Railways case on the necessity of basing the annual depreciation allowance on present fair value. Others have expressed the same
view. 53 Original cost had been used by the company in calculating the
annual depreciation allowance in the Lindheimer case under rules
laid down by the Interstate Commerce Commission in its "Uniform
System of Accounts for Telephone Companies." The Supreme Court
of the United States compared the accumulation in the reserve resulting
from this calculation with what was considered to be the amount of accrued depreciation, and in view of the disparity between the two figures
held that the company had not, with such depreciation charges included
in the operating expenses, shown the prescribed rates to be confiscatory. 54 This case is not clear authority for cost as the base for annual
depreciation. The matter of the proper base was not an issue. However,
the Virginia court specifically relied upon the case in allowing annual
depreciation based on cost while using present fair value as the rate
base. In contrast, the Missouri Supreme Court held in 1937 that the
52

Alexandria Water Co. v. Alexandria, 163 Va. 512, 177 S. E. 454 (1934).
MASON, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY DEPRECIATION 107 (1937); 1938
PRoc. NAT. AssN. R. R. & UTIL. CoMMRs. 460.
154
Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the Court, says: "If the predictions of service
life were entirely accurate and retirements were made when and as these predictions
were precisely fulfilled, the depreciation reserve would represent the consumption
of capital, on a cost basis, according to the method which spreads that loss over the
respective service periods. But if the amounts charged to operating expenses and credited
to the account for depreciation reserve are excessive, to that extent subscribers for the
telephone service are required to provide, in effect, capital contributions, not to make
good losses incurred by the utility in the service rendered and thus to keep its investments unimpaired, but to secure additional plant and equipment upon which the utility
expects a return." Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 292 U. S. 151 at 168-169,
54 S. Ct. 658 (1933).
53
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annual allowance must be on fair value. 55 The United Railways case
was cited as authority and no mention of the Lindheimer case was made.
Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in the United Railways
case said a depreciation charge based on original cost had been uniformly applied by the public utility commissions of the several states
when determining net income, past or expected, for rate-making purposes.56 For this he cited authority from eleven states. The classifications of accounts of many states require cost to be used. In addition
to the eleven states whose commissions were said by him to require
cost, Justice Brandeis listed ten others whose classifications of accounts
required it.
The United Railways case has influenced some state commissions.
The year before the Virginia case, and before the decision in the Lindheimer case, the Maryland Public Service Commission had ruled that
it was bound by the United Railways case to use present fair value as
the base for annual depreciation. 57 Likewise the New York ( State
Division),58 the Montarta/0 and the Washington 60 commissions have
all accepted fair value in recent cases. 61 In so doing the New York
Commission said:
"Reproduction cost is not capital. It is equivalent to investment
only in rare cases; so rare there seem not to have been any instances of record. When prices have risen to a higher level or have
fallen to a lower level than existed at the time the various parts
of the property were built, reproduction cost departs from the
55 State ex rel. Laclede Gas Light Co. v. Public Service Comm., 341 Mo. 920,
S. W. (2d) 749 (1937).
116
United Railways & Electric Co. of Baltimore v. West, 280 U. S. 234 at 273,
50 S. Ct. 123 (1930).
117
Re Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1933) 1 P. U. R.
{N. S.) 346. The Rhode Island Commission in a case decided January 7, 1939 ruled
that prudent investment was to be used for both annual and accrued depreciation purposes and for the rate base (Division of Pub. Utilities v. Naragansett Elec, Co., 27
P. U. R. {N. S.) 106 (1939). Massachusetts has followed this view for years and
California has used historical cost. Wisconsin is also said to have followed one or the
other of these theories. Kauper, ''Wanted: A New Definition of the Rate Base," 37
M1cH. L. REV. 1209 at 1231, note 58 (1939).
118
Re Long Island Lighting Co., 18 P. U. R. (N. S.) 65 (1936).
119 Re Big Hom Oil & Gas Dev. Co., (Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1938) 27
P. U. R. (N. S.) 41.
eo Department of Public Works v. Oregon-Washington Water Service Co., (Wash.
Dept. Pub. Works 1934) 8 P. U. R. (N. S.) 293.
61 New York and Montana are among the states listed by Brandeis as requiring
cost to be used. Washington is not. Arizona, another state not listed by Brandeis,
required fair value to be used in Re Central Arizona Light & Power Co., {Ariz. Corp.
Comm. 1934) 6 P. U. R. (N. S.) 49.
IIO
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basis of investment. So far as reproduction cost is an element in
determining the value of the property upon a given date, that
value departs from investment; and any depreciation charge computed upon reproduction cost or rate base under such circumstances does not meet the requirements laid down by Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes, namely, 'to maintain the integrity of the investment.'" 62
The commission uses the "base cost" (apparently the New York equivalent for present fair value) in spite of this comment. It says there is
little difference in this case between the depreciation calculated on original cost and on base cost and adopts base cost. Presumably it felt bound
to do this regardless of the amount of the difference.
Just what position the majority of the commissions will take in view
of the United Railways case and the interpretation placed by the Virginia court on the Lindheimer case is difficult to predict. Many
commissions still appear to follow cost. In reading the cases one gets
the impression that the commissions see nothing inconsistent in the use
of a rate base conforming to the rule in Smyth v. Ames ( with a deduction for accrued depreciation supposedly in conformity therewith) and
at the same time the allowance of annual depreciation on original cost.
It was to be expected that the United Railways case would awaken
them to this problem, but the cases do not indicate any difficulty in
many states on this score. Apparently any inconsistency that arises here
is permitted to merge into the more obvious inconsistency that arises
between annual depreciation, on whatever basis it is taken, and the
accrued depreciation claimed by the utilities on an "observed depreciation" basis. It may be the commissions feel that progress toward a sound
treatment of depreciation can best be reached one step at a time, and
that an insistence upon the calculation of the depreciation: reserve on a
reproduction cost basis for deduction as accrued depreciation is at present simply more than they can hope for. 68 While this is a possible explanation of the refusal to observe and remedy this inconsistency in
bases for annual and accrued depreciation, the more potent reason may
be the reluctance of the commissions· to concede the validity of the
present fair value theory itself in rate regulation. Any support to be
62

Re Long Island Lighting Co., 18 P. U. R. (N. S.) 65 at 190-191 (1936).
What is said here has to do. with necessary increase of a depreciation reserve
accumulated on a cost basis to an equivalent percentage of reproduction cost new.
Obviously in any case where present prices were above cost, conversion of the reserve
in this manner would result in an increase, thus establishing more dollars of accrued
depreciation than shown by the reserve.
68
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found for cost as a basis for the annual allowance in the Lindheimer case
seems likewise to rest upon an unexpressed distaste for the fair value
doctrine.
The commissions are not alone in favoring original cost as a basis for
the annual depreciation charge. As pointed out by Justice Brandeis in
the United Railways case, original cost is followed for income tax purposes, it is th~ practice of public accountants to use it, the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States has approved it, and corporate securities are issued, bought, and sold, and vast loans are made daily, in
reliance upon statements which use original cost as the depreciation
base. In addition, it is recognized and applied by many other official
agencies besides the regulatory commissions.

Methods of Determining Annual Depeciation
It is not the writer's purpose to consider all the many different
methods of calculating the annual depreciation charge for the various
periods during service life of an asset. Proponents of different plans
have brought forth theories for increasing annual charges, for decreasing annual charges, for charges varying with revenue or with operations, char_ges based upon interest 'calculations, charges dependent
wholly upon observation and appraisals, and many other theories. In
public utility regulation only four methods have received any real
consideration. These are: the renewal or replacement method, the
retirement reserve method, the sinking-fund method, and the straightline method. Only the last two of these are true depreciation accounting methods. The renewal or replacement method takes no account of
loss of service value except upon replacement of property, while the
retirement reserve method provides retirement expense charges in
advance of replacement solely as a means· of equalizing and providing
for replacement costs and not because of any recognition of depreciation. These four methods will be explained and considered from the
point of view of their relationship to the problem of consistency in
depreciation theories.
The renewal or replacement method treats the cost of equipment
purchased for replacement as an operating expense and preserves the
original record of the first cost in the property account. If no replacement is made, no expense appears for retirement of property. No
advance provision is made for loss of service value as the property is
used. Obvious defects exist in such a method. The periods benefited
by use of property are not charged with the consumed value thereof;
replacements may not be in kind and may be made at costs materially
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higher or lower than the cost of the original property; some property
may never be replaced, thus becoming a permanent part of the rate
base though no longer in effective use. The matter of consistency is
irrelevant to this method, since the rate base is not made to depend in
any way upon what has been charged to operating expenses. It does
show full .value of property for rate base purposes and allows no
charge to operating expense for old property now in use. Its only
consistency lies in i~s complete disregard of depreciation accounting,
both for rate base purposes and for operating expense purposes.
The retirement reserve method, which is advocated by the utilities
today, is predicated upon the theory that depreciation is a replacement
problem and that the reserve is necessary merely as a means of equalizing retirement costs and not as a means of recording exhausted service
capacity or value. 64 It has been adopted by a number of state commissions for certain types of utilities in accordance with the uniform system
of accounts adopted by the 1922 convention of the National Association of Railroad and Utility Commissioners. This method, of all the
four methods mentioned above, approaches most closely the engineer's
theory of depreciation. U oder it, charges to operating expenses are
irregular, often depending upon the amount of earnings, and additions
to the reserve may be made from surplus. 65 In the words of the Wisconsin Public Service Commission:
"the provision for retirement losses under retirement accounting
becomes largely a matter of financial expediency, only by accident
represents the actual consumption of property, misstates the current cost of production and may inequitably shift depreciation cost
among customers in different years, and affords no reliable standards for commissions to judge the adequacy or reasonableness of
the amounts recovered for consumption of property." 66
On the grounds of consistency, the retirement reserve method has in
its favor that the amount of the retirement reserve is more nearly in
line with the observed depreciation which the utility will claim as accrued depreciation than the amount of the reserve under straight-line
or sinking-fund accounting for depreciation. This result, however, can
be traced to the utility's anticipation of small replacement requirements
MASON, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY DEPRECIATION 72 (1937).
Nash, "Depreciation Accounting Methods for Public Utilities," 1929 PRoc.
lNTERNAT. CoNG. ON AccTG. 307. See also, Nash, "The Forgotten Man in the Depreciation Controversy,'' 14 PUB. UT1L. FoRTN. 506, 569 (1934).
11
G W1scoNSIN PuBuc SERVICE CoMMissioN, DEPRECIATION 34 (1933).
Gi
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and is due to chance rather than recognition by the utilities of any need
for consistency in theories of annual and accrued depreciation.
As strict accounting methods of dealing with annual depreciation,
the straight-line method and the sinking-fund method are the two
most prevalent, and the only ones which have received consideration
by either the courts or the commissions to any great extent. Straightline accounting is the more common with utilities using true depreciation accounting. 67 On the score of consistency between annual depreciation and accrued depreciation, the sinking-fund method would, if
handled as the authorities in the past have almost uniformly treated it,
appear to have the advantage. Practically all the authorities, until very
recently, have agreed that where this method is followed for annual
depreciation no deduction need be made from the rate base for accrued
depreciation/ 8 The deduction of accrued depreciation for rate base
purposes under the newer sinking fund method 69 is due to the altered
amount taken as annual depreciation, as compared with that taken
under the older form of this method, and not because of disagreement
with the refusal to make the deduction under the older form.
According to the sinking-fund method in its older form, which
is the usual conception of the method, there is determined the equal
annual amount of money which, invested at the close of each year
during the use of the property, with compound interest at an assumed
rate, will yield a total sum at the expected date of retirement equal to
the depreciation base ( total depreciable value on whatever theory of
value is adopted for depreciation purposes). This amount is then considered the annual depreciation, and the reserve is increased periodically by this amount with offsetting charges to depreciation expense.
However, this amount would be insufficient in itself to accumulate a
reserve equal to the depreciable value of the property by retirement
date because the interest is not included in this entry. An additional
credit is therefore made to the reserve each year in the amount of the
interest at the assumed rate on the theoretical fund accumulated from
past annual depreciation and interest thereon. The offsetting charge for
67

Report of the Special Committee on Depreciation, 1938 PRoc. NAT. ASSN.
R. R. & UriL. CoMMRS. 448.
68
W1scoNSIN PuBLIC UTILITIES CoMMISSION, DEPRECIATION 8 5 et seq. ( 193 3);
MASON, PRINCIPLES OF PunLic-UTILITY DEPRECIATION 87 et seq. (1937); Clark's
Ferry Bridge Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Service Comm., 291 U. S. 227, 54 S. Ct.
427 (1934); Kooker v. Perkasie Sewer Co., (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm. 1938) 27 P. U. R.
(N. S.) 461. A contrary view is taken in Idaho Power Co. v. Thompson, (D. C.
Idaho, 1937) 19 F. (2d) 547.
69
Infra, page 180.
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this credit is to operating net income or to surplus. Since the assets
retained from net income by these charges are the property of the
utility and since the earnings on these assets belong to it, there is need
to permit the utility to maintain the entire value of the depreciating
property in the rate base in order to allow a return sufficient to offset
the addition to the reserve which it must make out of its earnings or
surplus.
The consistency in the sinking fund method on the score that no
deduction for accrued depreciation is made for rate base purposes
would not exist under the procedure recently recommended to be followed in applying the sinking-fund method. According to this view,
the rate of interest used for sinking fund calculations would be the
same as that allowed as a rate of return and there would be included in
the annual depreciation charge the amount of the so-called interest on
the reserve balance instead of requiring the utility to provide this part
of the addition to the reserve out of operating net income or surplus. 70
Obviously there is no justification for failure to deduct the accrued
depreciation for rate base purposes here, and the question of consistency
arises as it does in the straight-line method.
Even under the earlier form of the sinking-fund method, the depreciable value, which is used to define the aggregate amount of the
accumulation from the annual depreciation, must be in agreement with
the property value used for rate base purposes (less salvage, of course);
otherwise the inconsistency emphasized by the United States Supreme
Court in the United Railways case exists. To make these two bases
agree it would be necessary, under the fair value rate base doctrine, to
recompute the annual depreciation annuity each time the rate base
changed because of a change in prices. The same applies to the straightline method, of course.
Under the straight-line method of accounting for annual depreciation, the total depreciable value of the property is divided by the
number of periods in the estimated service life of the property and the
resultant figure is the periodic depreciation. It is called "straight-line"
because when the depreciating value of the property is plotted on a
time chart it declines in a straight line from original depreciable value
when purchased to scrap value at estimated retirement date. Under
70

Report of the Special Committee on Depreciation, 1938 PRoc. NAT. AssN. R.R.

& UTJL. CoMMRS. 440-441. This report does not clearly explain the reasons for the

adoption of this procedure. For further explanation of the reasons which apparently
induced the recommendation of change, see MASON, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY
DEPRECIATION 87 et seq. (1937).
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either the straight-line or sinking-fund methods the reserve for depreciation will, at estimated retirement date, just equal the depreciable
value of the property. 71
So far as the annual depreciation is concerned, both the straight-line
and the sinking-fund method have received approval by the commissions,12 and by the courts. 73 The great majority of the commissions
have adopted the straight-line method. 74 The reasons for its approval,
as given in the Report of the Special Committee on Depreciation of
the National Association of Railroad and Utility Commissioners, are as
follows: ( r) it is simpler and easier to apply than the sinking-fund
method, which really requires a unit basis of calculation because of
the importance of the time factor in this method; (2) excessive and
deficient accruals of depreciation are not so serious as under the sinking-fund method; (3) later years are not burdened more than earlier
years as under the sinking-fund method which fails to take into account
71 This would be true for an individual unit of property. The sinking-fund reserve
would grow by smaller amounts than the straight-line reserve in early years, and by
larger amounts than the straight-line reserve during late periods of use. It would always
be less than the straight-line reserve until the close of the last period of predicted use.
72 Straight-line: Re Bronx Gas & Elec. Co., (N. Y. Dept. Pub. Serv., State Div.
1937) 24 P. U. R. (N. S.) 65; Re Brooklyn Borough Gas Co., (N. Y. Dept. Pub.
Serv., State Div. 1937) 21 P. U. R. (N. S.) 353; Re Wisconsin Power & Light Co.,
(Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1938) 24 P. U. R. (N. S) 136; Department of Public
Works v. Oregon-Washington Water Service Co., (Wash. Dept. Pub. Works, 1934)
8 P. U. R. (N. S.) 293; Blytheville v. Blytheville Water Co., (Ark. Dept. Pub. Util.
1936) 15 P. U. R. (N. S.) 177; Telephone and Railroad Depreciation Charges, 177
I. C. C. 431 (1931). See also citations by Reis in 1934 PRoc. NAT. AssN. R. R. &
UTIL. CoMMRS. 227-236, for both commission and court cases pro and con on straightline depreciation.
Sinking-fund: Kooker v. Perkasie Sewer Co., (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm. 1938)
27 P. U. R. (N. S.) 461; Los Angeles v. Southern California Tel. Co., (Cal. R. R.
Comm. 1936) 14 P. U. R. (N. S.) 252; Re Union Elec. Light & Power Co., (Mo.
Pub. Serv. Comm. 1937) 17 P. U. R. (N. S.) 337; Municipal Gas Co. v. Wichita
Falls, (Tex. R. R. Comm. 1935) 9 P. U. R. (N. S.) 33.
73
Straight-line: Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 292 U.S. 151, 54 S. Ct.
658 (1933); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U. S. 232, 57 S. Ct.
170 (1936) (an accounting case); Long Island Lighting Co. v. Maltbie, 249 App.
Div. 918, 292 N. Y. S. 807 (1937); Cheltenham & Abington Sewerage Co. v. Public
Service Comm., 122 Pa. Super. 252, 186 A. 149 (1936); Michigan Bell Tel. Co.
v. Odell, (D. C. Mich. 1930) 45 F. (2d) 180; Southern Indiana Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. Indiana Public Service Comm., (D. C. Ind. 1932) 1 P. U. R. (N. S.) 285.
Sinking-fund: Clark's Ferry Bridge Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Service Comm.,
291 U.S. 227, 54 S. Ct. 427 (1934); Los Angeles Gas & Elect. Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, 289 U. S. 287, 53 S. Ct. 637 (1933); Railroad Commission
of California v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302 U.S. 388, 58 S. Ct. 334 (1938).
u 2 BoNBRIGHT, THE VALUATION oF PROPERTY II 33 ( 193 7). See also the address
by Reis, 1934 PRoc. NAT. AssN. R.R. & UTIL. CoMMRS. 215.
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increasing repair and maintenance costs on aging property; ( 4) greater
security is offered to investors than under the sinking-fund method
because the reserves accumulate faster and are invested, usually in the
plant; (5) it is the more commonly used method for tax purposes,
general accounting, etc.; ( 6) it is more flexible than the sinking-fund
method. 75
Usually the choice between depreciation methods is not presented
to the courts squarely, and whatever method permits an adequate
return to avoid confiscation is acceptable. Writers on this subject agree,"'
and the courts so hold, 77 that the determination of annual depreciation
and of accrued depreciation prior to actual retirement of the property
is a matter of esti.µiate in which judgment and opinion must be exercised. These estimates must not permit appreciation or going value
to offset the accruing depreciation,78 and they must be made on the
assumption that the property is being used by a going concern. 79
The calculation of depreciation does, probably, require an engineer's determination (not factual solely, but as a combination of
observed physical phenomena with conclusions resulting from the
application of sound judgment and opinion as to probable causes of
retirement other than physical exhaustion). This determination should
have to do with elapsed service life and should recognize experience as
a factor evidencing what may be expected as to causes and times of
retirement,80 in order that the portion of total service life already
expired may be fairly estimated. Until this determination has been
made, no sound attempt can be made to distribute the depreciable value
of the property to past and future periods. Once this determination has
been made, however, the problem of determining depreciation, annual
or accrued, for a public utility becomes one of selecting the amounts
which are fair to the utility investors and to the consuming public.
With this in mind, the aim should be to apportion the total depreciable value ( whether it be original cost, present fair value, or some
75
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other amount) over the anticipated periods included in the estimated
service life in accordance with the benefits to be derived from the
property in those respective periods. 81
While property is new, repair costs on that property will be small
and the use of the property in such periods confers a greater benefit
than does its use in later periods when repair costs have increased
because of age, assuming of course that the repair costs are offset against
the gross benefits. On the other hand, service capacity presently consumed but which will not have to be replaced for, say twenty years, is
obviously not fairly chargeable with as large a part of a joint cost as is
similar service capacity consumed in the twentieth year, which will
have to be replaced at the close of that year, because the recovered
portion of the joint cost for the first year's use itself begins immediately
to work for the owner of the property to aid in its later replacement.
Supporters of the sinking-fund method of calculating annual depreciation rely upon this latter point. However, if the relative annual
repair costs are taken into consideration in connection with the increasing value of the service capacity consumed as the date for replacement
approaches, the net benefits from a given property may be seen to be
much more equal from year to year under a straight-line method of
depreciation than under the sinking-fund method because these repair
costs offset the added value of the consumed service capacity in the
later years of life. In addition to this, it may be pointed out that after
a utility has matured and the age distribution of its properties has become spread more or less evenly from new to virtual retirement age,
any errors which might result from charging too much to earlier periods
for use in the case of new property would automatically be counterbalanced by errors in charging too little in the case of older properties.
In view of these facts, combined with the further fact that straight-line
depreciation is much simpler to apply than the sinking-fund method
and gives less emphasis to errors in estimates of service life, the commissions and courts which have approved it seem to have followed
sound policy. As said by Justice Brandeis "rate regulation is an intensely practical matter." 82
81 In any case this depreciation is not capable of mathematically accurate calculation.
Goddard, "The Interest of Public Utility Ratepayers in Depreciation," 48 HARV.
L. REV. 721 at 747 (1935). See also the dissenting opinion of Brandeis in United
Railways & Electric Co. of Baltimore v. West, 280 U. S~ 234 at 255, 50 S. Ct. 123
(1936).
82
United Railways & Electric Co. of Baltimore v. West, 280 U. S. 234 at 280,
50 S. Ct. 123 (1930).
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It is the contention of the writer that a consistent theory of depreciation, whereby original cost is distributed over estimated service life
by a straight-line method on annual depreciation and the depreciation
reserve thereby accumulated is deducted from original cost for rate
base purposes, is the only sound and workable theory of depreciation
for use in public utility regulation. 88 As has been said, "value" has a
peculiar meaning in public utility regulation. What could be more
equitable and "fair'' than to establish a consistent, unified theory of
depreciation under which depreciable value once recovered by the
utility through annual depreciation charges is deducted ( as accumulated) from total depreciable value of the depreciating property for
rate base purposes? Once such a doctrine is approved by direct statutory
legislation, or through regulations promulgated by regulatory commissions under legislative authority, there would appear to be no grounds
for questioning the constitutionality of enforcement of depreciation requirements in accordance therewith. Utility investors thereafter would
be bound by their knowledge of the regulations covering the field in
which they invested their capital. 84 The straight-line method of determining annual depreciation would be included in this unified theory
because of its inherent fairness as pointed out above.
Actually some commissions already hold that the utility is estopped
to deny that the reserve accumulated by it from its annual depreciation
charges represents the minimum accrued depreciation. 85 This is particularly important in the case of those utilities, like the telephone com83

ln the NEw YoRK CoMMISSION ON REVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICE CoMM1ss10N
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law be worded to require deduction of the depreciation reserve accumulated on the
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Cook, "A Statutory Definition of Fair Value: A Proposal," 7 GEo. WASH. L.
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accrued and annual depreciation would, if in accord with legislative grant of authority,
accomplish the same result so far as depreciation is concerned.
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P. U. R. 1933B 319.
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panies, which have adopted the straight-line method of depreciation
for the annual allowance claimed. The reason for this is that under
this method depreciation is charged to operating expense earlier in the
life of the property than under either the renewal or the retirement
reserve method which is now in use. To offset this increase in costs in
the early years of use of the property, which of course must be covered by the rates the consumer is required to pay, the consumer should
be entitled to have the decreased value of the property recognized in
order that he be required to provide only a return on the capital
remaining invested in that property. The utility should not be permitted to eat its cake and have it too.
A federal district court has taken a realistic view of depreciation in
holding a utility estopped to deny deduction of the reserve accumulated
by it in accordance with its agreement with the commission even though
the agreement was not formal and by the court's admission could not
have been enforced. The agreement is treated as evidence of what
should be accumulated in order to keep the financial condition of the
company safe for stockholders and patrons, and the company's consent
to the amount set by the agreement and its charge to annual operating
expense of that amount is held to create an estoppel to deny the correctness of the amount for accrued depreciation purposes. 86 The court
says a contrary holding would induce the commission to cut depreciation
allowances to the bone because the commissioners would feel the deduction for annual depreciation might turn out to be only another name
for a credit to undivided profits. There is obviously more than a little
truth in what the court says. If the regulations of the commission have
the effect of restraining utilities from making inconsistent claims of
accrued depreciation after having been allowed annual depreciation
totaling a particular sum, the investors should have no complaint.
They invested with knowledge of the restraint. The amount of depreciation occurring each year is impossible of accurate determination and
the commission might, in order to prevent a part of the allowance
being used in effect as a credit to undivided profits, limit the annual
allowance to a very small figure. If, instead, the commission allows a
larger annual charge under the assumption that it will be used both for
annual and accrued depreciation purposes, no harm has been done by
requiring deduction of the reserve accumulated when determining the
rate base. Under such a policy both the public and the utility investors
86
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are accorded "fair" treatment, which, according to Professor Goddard,
is the end to be desired in depreciation accounting, 81 as is the case also
in the determination of the rate base.
What has just been said is not meant to be a statement of the law
as it stands today. Perhaps a majority of local utilities still insist upon
the retirement reserve method of accounting,88 and in rate cases it is
not the object of the commission to show that more annual depreciation
should be provided than the company claims. Such acceptance as is
given to straight-line depreciation on the part of the commissions is
perhaps attributable to an attempt to meet in a practical way the problems of regulation rather than to any clear convictions of its superiority
over other methods. The commissions have not sought to justify
straight-line depreciation on the ground that it makes for any greater
consistency between annual and accrued depreciation than other methods.
As has been seen, it is perhaps harder to secure consistency with it than
with the earlier form of the sinking-fund method under which no
deduction was made for accrued depreciation for rate base purposes.
As for judicial treatment of the problem, recognition of the need for
consistency between the amounts of annual and accrued depreciation
under straight-line depreciation accounting ( or for that matter under
any true depreciation accounting method) is practically non-existent.
As has been seen, when straight-line depreciation has been claimed
or required the courts haye been willing to accept it in both accounting
and in rate cases. The United States Supreme Court approved its use
in the Lindheimer case though the issue was not squarely presented in
that case. Approval on the part of the courts has, however, been a
recognition by them of its agreement with what the court determines
to be actual depreciation from all the evidence in the case. If the principles suggested by the writer were accepted it would be necessary,
probably, to support the straight-line depreciation by current check
upon the estimated service life of the property in order to satisfy legal
requirements.
The use of original cost as a rate base, as suggested by the writer
as a necessary part of a consistent depreciation policy, has certainly not
yet been approved by the United States Supreme Court. It is not at all
certain, however, that the Court as now constituted would not see fit
to reconsider the fair value doctrine and adopt a more realistic approach
117
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to rate regulation if a case came before it squarely presenting the issue. 89
The doctrine is presently being barraged from all sides. 00
[The second part of this article dealing with accrued
depreciation will appear in a subsequent issue.]
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